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Control over adversarial packet-dropping communication networks revisited
V. Ugrinovskii C. Langbort
Abstract— We revisit a one-step control problem over an
adversarial packet-dropping link. The link is modeled as a set
of binary channels controlled by a strategic jammer whose
intention is to wage a ‘denial of service’ attack on the plant
by choosing a most damaging channel-switching strategy. The
paper introduces a class of zero-sum games between the jammer
and controller as a scenario for such attack, and derives
necessary and sufficient conditions for these games to have a
nontrivial saddle-point equilibrium. At this equilibrium, the
jammer’s optimal policy is to randomize in a region of the
plant’s state space, thus requiring the controller to undertake
a nontrivial response which is different from what one would
expect in a standard stochastic control problem over a packet
dropping channel.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The topic of control over a communication channel has
been extensively studied in the past decade, with issues such
as the minimum data rate for stabilization [1], [2], [3], [4],
[5] and optimal quadratic closed-loop performance [6], [7],
[8] being the main focus. Other issues of interest concern
effects of channel-induced packet drops and/or time-varying
delays on closed-loop performance.
The majority of papers concerned with control over net-
works regards the mechanism of information loss in the
network as probabilistic but not strategic. In contrast, in the
problem of control over an adversarial channel, the commu-
nication link is controlled by a rogue jammer whose intention
is to mount a cyber attack on the system by actively jamming
the communication link. Its objectives are to impose on the
controller a control law which cannot be expected under
regular operating conditions in a packet-dropping network.
If the controller is unaware of the jammer’s actions and
continues to follow a control policy designed for a regular
network, the system performance is likely to be inferior. It is
this situation that is considered as a scenario of a successful
cyber attack by the jammer.
A natural way to describe the problem of control over an
adversarial channel is to employ a game-theoretic formula-
tion. Originally proposed in [9], this idea has been followed
upon in a number of recent papers including [10], [15]. A
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zero-sum dynamic game between a controller performing a
finite horizon linear-quadratic control task and a jammer,
proposed in [10], specifically accounted for the jammer’s
strategic intentions and limited actuation capabilities, but
was otherwise agnostic regarding the type of channel in-
volved. A startling conclusion of [10] was that in order to
maximally disrupt the control task, the jammer must act in
a markedly different way than a legitimate, non-malicious,
packet-dropping channel. Once this deterministic behavior is
observed by the controller, it can establish with certainty that
an attack has taken place.
In [15], we introduced a different model, which, while
capturing the same fundamental aspects of the problem as in
[10], modified the jammer’s action space so that each jammer
decision corresponded to a choice of channel rather than to
passing/blocking transmission. The corresponding one-step
zero-sum game was shown to have a unique saddle point in
the space of mixed jammer strategies. In turn, the controller’s
best response to the jammer’s optimal randomized strategy
was to act as if it was operating over a packet-dropping
channel whose statistical characteristics were controlled by
the jammer. Since under normal circumstances the controller
cannot be aware of these characteristics, and cannot imple-
ment such a best response strategy, we regard the zero-sum
game in [15] as an example of a successful cyber attack.
In this paper, we show that such a situation is not specific
to the zero-sum game considered in [15]. We introduce a
class of zero-sum stochastic games that generalize the model
introduced in [15]. For these games we obtain necessary
and sufficient conditions which guarantee the existence of
optimal jammer’s strategies whose nature suggests that the
jammer must select its actions randomly, in order to make a
maximum impact on the control performance. Our conditions
are quite general, they apply to nonlinear systems and
draw on standard convexity/coercivity properties of payoff
functions. Furthermore, we specialize these conditions to the
linear-quadratic control problem over a packet-dropping link
considered in [15] and show that our conditions allow for an
express characterization of a set of plant’s initial states for
which optimal randomized jammer strategies exist (this is in
contrast to [15] where a complete analysis of the state space
had to be performed to determine such regions). We also
compute an optimal controller response to those strategies,
which turns out to be nonlinear.
Our analysis is restricted to one-step zero-sum games.
Although such a formulation is admittedly simple, due to
the general nature of the game under consideration, it can
be thought of as reflecting a more general situation where
one is dealing with a one-step Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-
Isaacs min-max problem associated with a multi-step optimal
control problem. Also, even a one-step formulation provides
a rich insight into a possible scenario of cyber attacks on
controller networks. We believe that such an insight can be
valuable as was the case, e.g., in early studies of adver-
sarial channels and multi-agent decision problems involving
incomplete information [12].
We present our model in Section II. The problem for-
mulation, its assumptions and preliminary results are given
in Section III. The main result of the paper that gives
a necessary and sufficient condition for the game under
consideration to have a nontrivial saddle point is presented in
Section IV. Next, in Section V we demonstrate an application
of this result to the linear-quadratic static problem which
is an extension of the problem in [15]. In this problem,
the jammer is offered an additional reward for undertaking
actions concealing its presence. Conclusions are given in
Section VI.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
The general model description is an extension of that in
[15]. We consider a situation where a strategic jammer is
attacking the link in the feedback loop between a controller
and a plant. The plant is a general discrete-time system
described by
x+ = F (x, v) (1)
with a given initial condition; x ∈ RN is the state, v is
a scalar input, F (·, ·) is an RN -valued function defined on
R
N × R.
The plant input v and the control signal u are related by
the equation
v = bu,
which describes the transmission of information from the
controller to the plant over a packet-dropping communication
link. Here, b is a discrete random variable taking value in
{0, 1}, that describes the transmission state of the link. The
value of b depends on actions of the jammer and the state
of the communication link, as explained below.
The communication link consists of a finite set F of chan-
nels (with |F | = n) out of which the jammer can draw with
certain probability a channel to replace the currently active
channel so as to optimally disrupt the control task. Each
channel can be either in passing or blocking state, and the
transmission states of all channels randomly change after one
of them is selected as a replacement. Hence, each channel
fj ∈ F represents a binary channel with the state space
{0, 1}, as pictured in Figure 1. To describe the probability
model of channel transitions, let c−, c ∈ {0, 1}n denote the
vectors of transmission states of all channels before and
after the jammer has selected one of them to replace the
current one, respectively, with the jth component c−j , cj
denoting the corresponding transmission state of channel fj .
The probability of channel fj to become “passing” after the
replacement is selected, given its and all other channels’
previous transmission states, is then
qj = Pr(cj = 1|c
−). (2)
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Fig. 1. Each channel in F is a binary channel. Shown here is channel fj .
The jammer strategy is to choose a probability distribution
over F , indicating which channel it desires to switch to.
We denote this distribution by a vector p in the unit simplex
Sn−1 of Rn. That is, the jammer’s strategy is to influence the
selection of a channel linking the controller to the plant. Let
the index of the selected channel be S, then S is a discrete
random variable taking values in {1, ..., n}, distributed in
accordance with the vector p. The latter depends on the
information set available to the jammer which includes
the current state of the plant x, the index of the channel
occupying the link j−, and the vector of transmission states
of all channels c− which jammer observes before the link
switches from channel fj− to a new channel:
pj = Pr(S = j|x, c
−, j−) for all j = 1, ..., n. (3)
In addition, if the control input u is available to the jammer,
the vector p may depend on u as well.
After the jammer has made its decision, the random
variable S is realized and the link switches to the channel fS .
After that, the transmission state of all channels including fS
changes, according to (2). Thus, the jammer cannot predict
the transmission state of the channels in F when selecting
the probability vector p.
In accordance with this channel switching mechanism, the
transmission state of the link between the controller and the
plant is determined by the binary random variable cS , i.e.,
b = cS , which takes value 1 with probability p′q and value
0 with probability 1− p′q.
Clearly, b and S are statistically dependent. All random
variables considered in this paper will be adapted to the
joint conditional probability distribution of S and b, given x,
j− and c−. The expectation with respect to this conditional
probability distribution is denoted E[·].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARY
RESULTS
We now introduce a general two-player stochastic one-
step zero-sum game as follows. In this game, we assume
that the initial state of the plant x, the initial vector of
transmission states c− and the channel that initially occupies
the link fj− are known to both the jammer and controller. Let
σ(y, u, f) be a scalar function of (y, u, f) ∈ RN × R×F .
This function will determine the payoff of the game played
by the controller and the jammer. The standing assumptions
regarding this function are summarized below:
Assumption 1: For all fj ∈ F , σ(·, ·, fj) ∈ C1(RN ×R).
Assumption 2: For each fj ∈ F and x ∈ Rn, the
functions σ(F (x, 0), ·, fj) and σ(F (x, ·), ·, fj) are coercive.
Lemma 1: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for every x 6= 0
there exists a compact set U(x) ⊂ R with the properties:
(i) For all fj ∈ F ,
inf
u∈R
max
j
E[σ(x+, u, fS)|S = j]
= inf
u∈U(x)
max
j
E[σ(x+, u, fS)|S = j)]. (4)
(ii)
inf
u
E[σ(x+, u, fS)] = inf
u∈U(x)
E[σ(x+, u, fS)]. (5)
The proof is omitted for the sake of brevity. It proceeds
by first proving that the coercivity of the functions involved
ensures that the infima on the left hand side of (4) and (5)
exist. In particular, infu h(u) > −∞, h(u) , maxj hj(u),
hj(u) , E[σ(x
+, u, fS)|S = j]. Next we show that a
suitably defined set Uα = {u : h(u) ≤ α}, with a sufficiently
large α > infu h(u) can be chosen as U(x).
We now define the stochastic zero-sum min-max game
of interest for the plant (1). In this game, the controller is a
minimizing player who selects the control input u ∈ R based
on x, j− and c−. Also, the jammer is the maximizing player
who chooses a probability distribution vector p ∈ Sn−1 for
the ‘channel selection’ random variable S, as the function
of x, j−, c− and possibly u, as in (3). The controller’s best
action is determined by computing
J1 = inf
u
max
p∈Sn−1
E
[
σ(x+, u, fS)
]
. (6)
while the jammer’s best action is obtained by computing
J2 = max
p∈Sn−1
inf
u
E
[
σ(x+, u, fS)
]
. (7)
Our goal is to show that J1 = J2, i.e., that the corresponding
zero-sum game has a value.
Lemma 1 allows to reduce the minimization over u ∈ R in
(6) and (7) to minimization over a compact set U(x). Indeed,
the cost function of the inner maximization problem (6) is
linear in p, therefore using claim (i) of Lemma 1 leads to
the conclusion that
J1 = inf
u
max
j
E
[
σ(x+, u, fj)
]
= inf
u∈U(x)
max
j
E
[
σ(x+, u, fj)
] (8)
= inf
u∈U(x)
max
p∈Sn−1
E
[
σ(x+, u, fS)
]
. (9)
Also, it follows from claim (ii) of Lemma 1 that for every
p, the inner minimization problem in (7) can be carried out
over U(x). Thus,
J2 = max
p∈Sn−1
inf
u∈U(x)
E
[
σ(x+, u, fS)
]
. (10)
We make an additional assumption about the set U(x).
Assumption 3: The set U(x) is connected.
Under this assumption, the set U(x) is a closed bounded
interval, hence it is a convex set. Of course, this can be
guaranteed when σ is chosen so that each hj is convex.
Lemma 2: Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the value of
the game (6) exists, i.e., −∞ < J1 = J2 <∞. Furthermore,
the game has a (possibly non-unique) saddle point.
It is not unreasonable to assume that in the game (6)
the jammer, who observes the controller action u, can rank
all the channels according to the contribution they make
towards the payoff and order them accordingly. It can do so
by comparing the conditional expected cost values hj(u) =
E[σ(x+, u, S)|S = j].
Assumption 4: For any two channels fj , fk ∈ F , j, k 6=
j−, if j < k then
E[σ(x+, u, fS)|S = j] ≥ E[σ(x
+, u, fSS)|S = k] (11)
∀u ∈ U(x).
Assumption 4 generalizes the situation considered in [15]
where all channels were ranked according to the probability
of becoming passing, q1 < q2 < ... < qn. In Section V we
will show that such a natural ranking leads to satisfaction of
Assumption 4.
According to this assumption, the jammer who seeks a
higher value of payoff should favour channels with lower
numbers, since a larger reward is associated with these chan-
nels. In contrast, the controller actions should be directed
towards forcing the jammer into utilizing channels with
higher numbers. Also, the channel fj− is excluded from this
ranking. This is done to allow the jammer to consider contri-
butions to payoff other than those based on blocking/passing.
These considerations may either discourage the jammer from
switching, or conversely encourage it to undertake a denial-
of-service attack. Such decisions can be influenced by a
number of factors that are not related to channel properties.
The cost of channel switching is one reason as to why the
jammer may decide not to change the channel. Under another
scenario, the jammer may be offered a reward for remaining
stealthy, and may choose this reward over disrupting the
control loop. For instance, when the controller monitors the
link, an anomaly in the channel transition probabilities could
signal the attack. In this case, rewarding the jammer for not
defaulting to the most blocking channel unless it is absolutely
necessary will provide it with an incentive for not revealing
itself. In yet another class of problems, the jammer’s decision
could be based on the knowledge that the system is prepared
to tolerate service disruptions as long as the cost of such
disruptions is below the cost of rectifying them. We defer
detailed analyses of these situations to Section V. It should
be stressed that jammer decisions in each of these scenarios
will depend on the plant state x, the channel fj− and the
channel ranking (the latter may require knowledge of u).
Using the channel ranking introduced in Assumption 4, the
value and saddle points of the game (6) can be characterized
by solving a game over a reduced jammer strategy space.
This reduced game focuses on two channels, namely the
channel that currently occupies the link and the channel that
delivers the highest payoff to the jammer when it seeks to
block communications between the controller and the plant.
The latter channel is indexed as channel f1, by Assumption 4.
Let us introduce the reduced jammer action vector p˜ =
(p˜1, p˜2)
′
, p˜1, p˜2 ≥ 0, p˜1 + p˜2 = 1. Also, consider payoffs
associated with selecting channel f1 and keeping the current
channel fj− :
h˜1(u) = E
[
σ(x+, u, fS)|S = 1
]
,
h˜2(u) = E
[
σ(x+, u, fS)|S = j
−
]
,
and define h˜(u) = (h˜1(u), h˜2(u))′. Consider the following
‘reduced’ two-player game with upper value
J˜1 = inf
u
max
p˜∈S1
p˜′h˜(u) (12)
and lower value
J˜2 = max
p˜∈S1
inf
u
p˜′h˜(u). (13)
Lemma 3: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied. Then
J1 = J˜1 = J˜2 = J2. (14)
Furthermore, the zero-sum game (12) has a (possibly non-
unique) saddle point. Also, if (u∗, p˜∗) is such a saddle point,
then (u∗, p∗) is a saddle point of the game (6), where
p∗j =


p˜∗1, j = 1,
p˜∗
j−
j = j−,
0 j 6∈ {1, j−}.
(15)
IV. MAIN RESULTS
Lemma 3 allows the jammer to constrain its actions to the
set S¯ = {p : pj = 0, j 6= 1, j−} ⊂ Sn−1. Among these
actions there are two trivial actions: choose the most blocking
channel (channel f1 in our notation) by using p1 = 1 and
pj = 0, j 6= 1, or stay put by allocating pj− = 1 and pj =
0, j 6= j−, so that the controller continues communicating
with the plant over channel fj− . However, the question arises
as to whether there exist optimal mixed strategies in S¯ for
the jammer to undertake, i.e., optimal policy vectors p such
that 0 < pj < 1, j = 1, j−.
The first main result of this paper provides necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of nontrivial saddle
points. These conditions characterize the controller-jammer
games in which the jammer randomizes its choice of optimal
strategies. As we will see, this will force the controller to
respond in a non-obvious manner in order to remain optimal,
which ultimately represents a signature of an attack on the
communication link.
Theorem 1: Suppose h˜1, h˜2 are strictly convex functions
of u for all x. For every x, the zero-sum game (12) admits
a nontrivial saddle point (u∗, p˜∗) if and only if there exists
u¯ such that
h˜1(u¯) = h˜2(u¯), (16)
and one of the following conditions hold: either(
∂h˜1(u¯)
∂u
)(
∂h˜2(u¯)
∂u
)
< 0, (17)
or
∂h˜1(u¯)
∂u
=
∂h˜2(u¯)
∂u
= 0. (18)
V. A LINEAR-QUADRATIC CONTROLLER-JAMMER GAME
In this section, we specialize Theorem 1 to the controller-
jammer game where the plant is linear,
x+ = Ax+ bBu (19)
and the performance cost is quadratic. In this game the
jammer is rewarded for remaining stealthy. We show that
in this game, there is a region in the plant state space where
the jammer’s optimal policy is to randomize its channel
selection. Furthermore, an optimal control response to this
optimal jammer action is nonlinear.
Consider a controller-jammer game for the plant (19) with
the quadratic payoff
(‖x‖2 + ‖u‖2) + ‖x+‖2 + (δj,j− )τ.
Here, δj,k is the Kronecker symbol, and τ > 0 is the
constant ‘reward for stealthiness’ which the jammer receives
if the channel does not change as a result of its action.
As explained earlier, the rationale here is to reward the
jammer for keeping the current channel in the link when
excessive switching may reveal its presence, or may drain
its resources. This controller-jammer game was analyzed
in [15] (for a one-dimensional plant), where the region in the
state-space was found where the game has a unique saddle
point corresponding to a jammer’s nontrivial strategy. Such
a region was found by computing the game value directly,
which required a quite tedious analysis. Here, we revisit
this result of [15] from a more general perspective, using
conditions of Theorem 1.
The corresponding function σ in this case is
σ(y, u, fj) =
{
‖x‖2 + u2 + ‖y‖2, j 6= j−,
‖x‖2 + u2 + ‖y‖2 + τ, j = j−.
(20)
Clearly, the function σ defined in (20) satisfies Assump-
tions 1 and 2. Also in this case, the functions hj have the
form
hj(u) = E[σ(x
+, u, fS)|S = j]
= γj(x) + u
2 + rjqju(u+ 2β(x)), (21)
where
γj(x) =
{
x′(I +A′A)x, j 6= j−,
x′(I +A′A)x+ τ, j = j−,
β(x) = 1‖B‖2B
′Ax, and rj = ‖B‖2 for all j. Also, the
available channels are assumed to be ordered according to
their probability to become passing, that is,
q1 < q2 < . . . < qn. (22)
Lemma 4: Under condition (22), the set U(x) =
{u : u(u+2β(x) ≤ 0} verifies properties (i) and (ii) stated
in Lemma 1, and also satisfies Assumptions 3 and 4.
Under the above assumptions, the payoff functions h˜1 and
h˜2 for the reduced zero-sum game become
h˜1(u) = h1(u) and h˜2(u) = hj−(u). (23)
With these definitions, condition (16) reduces to the equation
u¯
(
u¯+
2
‖B‖2
B′Ax
)
=
τ
‖B‖2(q1 − qj−)
, (24)
which admits real solutions if 1‖B‖2x
′A′BB′Ax ≥ τ
q
j−
−q1
.
Also, condition (17) reduces to the condition
−
‖B‖2qj−
1 + ‖B‖2qj−
< u¯ < −
‖B‖2q1
1 + ‖B‖2q1
. (25)
Let
z =
τ‖B‖2
(qj− − q1)x′A′BB′Ax
.
The analysis of conditions (24), (25) shows that only one of
the solutions of equation (24),
u¯ , u∗
= −
1
‖B‖2
B′Ax
(
1−
√
τ‖B‖2
(q1 − qj−)x′A′BB′Ax
)
(26)
satisfies (25) provided
1−
1
(1 + ‖B‖2q1)2
< z < 1−
1
(1 + ‖B‖2qj−)2
. (27)
Condition (27) describes the region in the state space in
which the jammer’s optimal policy is to choose randomly
between the channel fj− currently in use and the most
blocking channel f1. Observe that in the case where the
plant (19) is scalar and B = 1, we recover the exactly same
condition as that obtained in [15] by direct computation.
That is, Theorem 1 confirms the existence of the nontrivial
optimal jammer’s strategy for this region. We refer the reader
to [15] for the exact value of the optimal vector p∗; the
calculation for the multidimensional plant (19) follows the
same lines, and is omitted for the sake of brevity. We also
point out that the optimal controller’s policy (26) is nonlinear.
Hence, any linear feedback policy that controller may employ
assuming that its signals are transmitted over a bona fide
packet dropping channel will lead to an inferior control
performance. We interpret this situation as a signature of
a successful DoS attack by the jammer.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analyzed a class of control problems
over adversarial channels, in which the jammer actively
attempts to disrupt communications between the controller
and the plant. We have posed the problem as a static game,
and have given necessary and sufficient conditions for such
a game to have a nontrivial saddle point. The significance
of these conditions is to allow a characterization of a set of
plant’s initial states for which a DoS attack can be mounted
that requires a nontrivial controller’s response. For instance,
in the linear quadratic problem analyzed in the paper the
optimal control law is nonlinear. This gives the jammer an
advantage over any linear control policy in those problems.
The jammer achieves this outcome by randomizing its choice
of a packet-dropping channel rather than operating packet
dropping facility directly.
On the other hand, the part of the state space where the
jammer randomizes is determined by the jammer’s cost of
switching (reward for not switching) and transition probabil-
ities of the current and the most blocking channels. If these
parameters can be predicted/estimated by the controller, it
has a chance of mitigating the attack by either eliminating
those regions, or steering the plant so that it avoids visiting
those regions.
Future work will be directed to further understanding
conditions for DoS attacks, with the aim to consider
dynamic/multi-step control problems. Another interesting
question is whether associating a distinct payoff with one
of the channels is necessary for the jammer to resort to
randomization.
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